By Kiran Sonawane, Senior Cloud & DevOps Engineer
Published: August 24, 2026 | Last Updated: September 18, 2026
Long-lived cloud credentials can remain dangerous long after they are exposed. In a large recheck of publicly leaked AWS credentials, Truffle Security reported that a substantial share of the keys it tested were still valid, including credentials with powerful account permissions.
The finding does not mean every exposed key was actively abused, but it does show how long leaked credentials can remain usable when they are not revoked. Similar operational gaps can compound other cloud risks, including configuration drift covered in our guide to Terraform State Drift.
What Did the Truffle Security Investigation Reveal?
According to the official Truffle Security report, researchers rechecked more than 64,000 AWS key pairs that had previously appeared in public sources. The company reported that 88% of the keys in its revalidated sample were still active. Among the credentials it could assess more deeply, many retained broad administrative access.
The research highlights a persistent secret-management problem: a credential can remain useful long after it first appears in a repository, dataset, log, or other public source. Truffle Security also documented highly privileged credentials, including root and administrator-level keys, within the sample.
| Key Type | Active Count | Why It Matters |
|---|---|---|
| AWS Root Keys | 526 | Root-user credentials are highly privileged and should not normally exist as long-lived access keys. |
| IAM Keys (AdminAccess) | 242 | Administrator-level IAM credentials can allow broad account actions depending on policy and account controls. |
Why Are These Leaked AWS Keys Still Active?
The persistence of the leaked AWS keys shows why long-lived credentials create durable risk. Truffle Security reported that many credentials in the sample were years old and had not been replaced, leaving a much longer exposure window than short-lived session credentials would create.
Truffle Security also reported that some credentials could still authenticate after AWS compromise-detection controls had been applied. That is an important distinction: automated quarantine or restriction can reduce risk, but it should not be treated as a substitute for revoking exposed credentials, investigating activity, and replacing them with safer authentication methods.
Immediate Mitigation: How to Secure Your AWS Account
To reduce this risk, inventory long-lived AWS access keys, remove credentials that are no longer required, revoke any key that may have been exposed, and prefer temporary credentials or workload identities wherever possible. Secret scanning should also be part of source-code and CI/CD workflows.
Do not wait for an automated alert before reviewing credential exposure. AWS recommends temporary credentials for human users and workloads where possible, and advises against creating root-user access keys. See the official AWS IAM security best practices and root user best practices. Take the following actionable steps today:
- Delete Root Keys: AWS Root accounts should never have active access keys. Use AWS IAM Identity Center for day-to-day administrative tasks.
- Reduce Long-Lived Keys: Prefer temporary credentials through IAM roles, federation, or AWS STS. If static keys are still required, rotate them according to your security policy and immediately after suspected exposure.
- Use Pre-Commit Hooks: Deploy tools like TruffleHog or git-secrets locally to prevent developers from accidentally pushing keys to GitHub.
- Monitor CloudTrail: Set up CloudWatch alarms for
StopLoggingorDeleteTrailAPI calls, which are major indicators of compromise (IoCs).
What the Research Does and Does Not Mean
The report shows that publicly exposed AWS credentials can remain valid for long periods and may retain significant privileges. It does not establish that every active key was abused, that every organization suffered a breach, or that exposure automatically resulted in account takeover.
For defenders, the practical takeaway is simpler: once a credential is public, its age or lack of observed abuse should not be treated as evidence that it is safe. The credential should be revoked or replaced, and recent activity should be reviewed.
Bottom Line
The Truffle Security findings are a reminder that long-lived cloud credentials can remain dangerous long after they are exposed. A single hardcoded key in a public repository or dataset may retain access until it is revoked. Moving toward short-lived, identity-based access reduces the window in which stolen credentials remain useful.
This risk becomes even more important as offensive automation accelerates credential abuse. See our newer analysis of autonomous AI agents harvesting cloud credentials in under six hours.
Frequently Asked Questions
What happens if an AWS Root Key is leaked?
A leaked AWS root access key is a critical incident because it authenticates as the account root user, which has extremely broad permissions. The key should be removed, the account activity reviewed, and root access secured with MFA.
Does AWS automatically disable leaked credentials?
AWS can apply restrictions when it detects compromised credentials, but that should not replace credential revocation and investigation. Exposed keys should be disabled or deleted and replaced with safer authentication methods.
How often should AWS access keys be rotated?
There is no single rotation interval that makes a long-lived key safe. AWS recommends reducing reliance on long-lived access keys and using temporary credentials where possible. Any key suspected of exposure should be revoked or rotated immediately.
